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Plea bargaining and guilty pleas are among the most unsavory
features of U.S. criminal procedure. In this sordid bazaar of
bargained-for justice, the prosecutor dominates the encounter. The
prosecutor is authorized to use an array of legally permissible threats
to coerce a defendant to accept his offer,1 to retaliate against a
defendant who declines his offer,2 or to engage in deception and
concealment to force the deal.3 Because they lack knowledge of the
evidence and the law-enforcement agenda, courts cannot or will not
meaningfully supervise the plea. And given the much harsher
consequences of a conviction after trial, a defendant has little choice
but to accept the offer. Abuses pervade the guilty-plea process, with
the unsettling consequence that millions more defendants are being
punished than ever before, often with less justification, and under
sloppier procedures.4
It is with respect to the prosecutor’s power to control the
evidence and to decide how much of it to share with a defendant
preplea that Professor R. Michael Cassidy aims his critique. In Plea
Bargaining, Discovery, and the Intractable Problem of Impeachment
*
Professor, Pace Law School.
1.
See, e.g., Brady v. United States, 397 U.S. 742 (1970); Miles v. Dorsey, 61 F.3d 1459
(10th Cir. 1995); United States v. Pollard, 959 F.2d 1011 (D.C. Cir. 1992).
2.
See Bordenkircher v. Hayes, 434 U.S. 357 (1978); United States v. Williams, 47 F.3d
658 (4th Cir. 1995).
3.
See United States v. Ruiz, 536 U.S. 622 (2002); People v. Jones, 375 N.E.2d 41 (N.Y.
1978). Jones held that a prosecutor was not required to disclose during plea negotiations that a
key witness had died. Id. at 42; see also ABA STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE: PROSECUTION
FUNCTION § 3-3.9 cmt. (3d ed. 1993) (“This Standard takes no position on this question.”).
4.
See WILLIAM J. STUNTZ, THE COLLAPSE OF AMERICAN CRIMINAL JUSTICE 264 (2011).
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Disclosures,5 Professor Cassidy deftly explores one of the most
controversial areas in criminal procedure—the extent to which a
prosecutor legally and ethically is required to disclose evidence and
information to a defendant before that defendant pleads guilty. The
question is far from abstract. As Professor Cassidy observes, given
several recent cases involving disclosure violations by prosecutors,6
various organizations have advocated broader pretrial disclosure—
specifically by amending Rule 16 of the Federal Rules of Criminal
Procedure to authorize more extensive and timely pretrial discovery to
criminal defendants.7 In addition, the ABA’s Standing Committee on
Ethics and Professional Responsibility recently issued a formal ethics
opinion purportedly extending a prosecutor’s disclosure obligations
well beyond the constitutional due process requirements established
by the Supreme Court.8
As a former state prosecutor, I recall the issues surrounding
preplea disclosures in practice. The give and take of the relatively
informal bargaining process typically focused on how much
information about the case I was willing to share with defense counsel
and, of course, the amount of punishment I would be willing to
recommend to the sentencing judge if the defendant accepted my offer.
I do not recall ever feeling legally or ethically obligated to disclose to
defense counsel the strengths and weaknesses of my case prior to the
plea; whatever disclosures I made were usually for tactical reasons to
obtain the plea. Some evidentiary information already had been
disclosed to the defense at the arraignment or shortly thereafter,
either through statutorily mandated notice requirements,9 bills of
particulars,10 or statutory discovery.11 More information would be
disclosed in the event the defendant decided to go to trial.12
I may have minimized potential weaknesses in my case and
focused on its strengths, and I am sure the defense attorney made
5.
64 VAND. L. REV. 1429 (2011).
6.
See Cone v. Bell, 556 U.S. 449 (2009) (remanding to district court for determination of
whether withheld evidence would have changed sentencing outcome in capital case); United
States v. Stevens, No. 08-cr-231 (EGS), 2009 WL 6525926 (D.D.C. Apr. 7, 2009) (discussing
prosecutor’s failure to produce evidence in trial of Senator Ted Stevens).
7.
See Cassidy, supra note 5, at 1445–52.
8.
See id. at 1452–59.
9.
See N.Y. CRIM. PROC. LAW § 700.70 (McKinney 2011) (electronic surveillance); id. §
710.30 (defendant’s statements and eyewitness observations).
10. See id. § 200.95.
11. See FED. R. CRIM. P. 16; N.Y. CRIM. PROC. LAW § 240.20.
12. See 18 U.S.C. § 3500(b) (2006) (requiring disclosure of statements by a prosecution
witness in federal trials after the witness has testified on direct examination); N.Y. CRIM. PROC.
LAW § 240.45 (requiring disclosure of prior statements of witness after jury sworn).
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similar representations. I was acutely aware that the defendant
suffered some degree of information deficit about potential
weaknesses in my proof. But it was precisely my awareness of the
potential vulnerabilities of my case, as well as the time and resources
I would be required to expend in preparing for trial, that drove my
plea offer—and, I should add, similar offers in well over ninety percent
of cases nationwide.13 It seemed clear to me that the defendant wanted
the plea, was willing to make a solemn declaration of his guilt in open
court, and was willing to assume the risk that his voluntary
settlement of the case was a better option than going to trial and being
found guilty. I did not view the process as fundamentally unfair.
Professor Cassidy, an expert in prosecutorial ethics,14 does see
a certain amount of unfairness in this one-sided and unlevel playing
field, especially with respect to the rules of discovery that greatly limit
the amount of information a defendant has access to before deciding
whether to plead guilty. His critique is correct. Criminal discovery is
one of the most unfair and dysfunctional features of American
criminal procedure. The absence of significant discovery in criminal
cases has been a long-standing target of critics who claim that it
makes a trial a game of “blind man’s bluff,”15 a “sporting event,”16 and
a virtual “trial by ambush.”17 Indeed, parties in a civil lawsuit for
nominal damages learn through pretrial discovery almost every fact
and theory about the other side’s case prior to deciding whether to
settle or go to trial; with few exceptions, criminal defendants who face
prison or worse learn very little about the prosecutor’s witnesses,

13. See Missouri v. Frye, 132 S. Ct. 1399, 1407 (2012) (stating that ninety-seven percent of
federal convictions and ninety-four percent of state convictions are obtained through guilty
pleas); Lafler v. Cooper, 132 S. Ct. 1376, 1388 (2012) (same); United States v. Ruiz, 536 U.S. 622,
632 (2002) (noting that plea bargaining occurs in the “vast number—90% or more—of federal
criminal cases”). It is unclear whether a tension may exist between the Frye/Lafler holdings and
Ruiz—particularly whether a lawyer who is counseling a client with respect to a plea is required
under Frye and Lafler to seek out and then advise a client on potential impeachment information
that could affect the client’s decision to plead guilty, even though a prosecutor has no duty to
disclose that information to counsel under Ruiz. To be sure, Frye and Lafler are distinguishable
from Ruiz; Frye dealt with a lawyer’s incompetence in failing to communicate to his client a plea
offer, and Lafler dealt with a lawyer giving a client bad advice that caused the client to reject a
plea offer. There is no suggestion that these cases would require a lawyer, in order to perform
effectively under the Sixth Amendment, to attempt to obtain and divulge impeachment evidence
to a client contemplating a plea.
14. See R. MICHAEL CASSIDY, PROSECUTORIAL ETHICS (2005).
15. United States v. Proctor & Gamble Co., 356 U.S. 677, 682 (1958).
16. William J. Brennan, Jr., The Criminal Prosecution: Sporting Event or Quest for Truth?,
1963 WASH. U. L.Q. 279, 279.
17. United States v. Kelly, 420 F.2d 26, 29 (2d Cir. 1969).
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evidence, and theory of guilt.18 Professor Cassidy carefully documents
the self-serving legal contortions of officials in the Department of
Justice to stonewall institutional efforts to amend the Federal Rules of
Criminal Procedure in extremely modest ways to try to level the
playing field.19 He also exposes as a toothless irrelevance the ethical
rules that address a prosecutor’s discovery duties.20
For half a century, critics have decried the disparity in
knowledge and resources between prosecution and defense with very
little success at achieving reform.21 Some prosecutor offices, mostly for
pragmatic reasons to ensure speedier processing of cases, have made
their own adjustments to discovery, notably by adopting “open file”
discovery policies.22 And, as Professor Cassidy points out, some federal
courts have used their own local court rules to order broader discovery
than the Federal Rules require, sometimes by enumerating the kinds
of evidence that prosecutors must disclose pretrial and the timing of
such disclosures.23 Broadening discovery rules, as Professor Cassidy
suggests, may be the most important reform to enable a defendant to
prepare for trial and effectively present his case.
But a “fair trial” and a “fair plea” are widely different concepts.
Broadening discovery to ensure a fair trial is a far cry from broadening
discovery to ensure a “fair plea,” and it is here that Professor Cassidy’s
critique misfires. The fairness of a trial contemplates a defendant in
possession of sufficient information to be able to challenge the
18. Opponents of expanded discovery often cite the opinion by Chief Judge Arthur
Vanderbilt in State v. Tune, 98 A.2d 881, 884–85 (N.J. 1953), arguing that expanded discovery
would facilitate perjured testimony, would lead to bribery and the intimidation of witnesses, and,
because the privilege against self-incrimination protects defendants from reciprocal discovery,
would be a one-way street favoring the accused.
19. See Cassidy, supra note 5, at 1445–52.
20. See id. at 1452–59.
21. See Bennett L. Gershman, The New Prosecutors, 53 U. PITT. L. REV. 393, 449–53
(1991).
22. See Panel Discussion, Criminal Discovery in Practice, 15 GA. ST. U. L. REV. 781, 786
(1999) (comments of G. Douglas Jones, United States Attorney for the Northern District of
Alabama) (“We’re taking the approach now that every document that we gather in the course of
an investigation will be made available to the defense. And it should be made available at the
time of arraignment.”). But see John G. Douglass, Fatal Attraction? The Uneasy Courtship of
Brady and Plea Bargaining, 50 EMORY L.J. 437, 461 (2001) (“Different prosecutors may offer
‘open file discovery’ and have vastly different ideas of what it means.”). In Banks v. Dretke, 540
U.S. 668 (2004), the prosecution represented that it had fully disclosed all relevant information
that its file contained, but the file did not include critical impeachment information relating to
one of the State’s key witnesses. In Strickler v. Greene, 527 U.S. 263 (1999), the prosecutor told
the defendant’s lawyer that the prosecutor’s files were open and thus there was no need for a
formal Brady motion, but the prosecution file given to defense counsel did not include several
previous statements made by one of the prosecution’s key witnesses that would have strongly
impeached her testimony.
23. See Cassidy, supra note 5, at 1483–84.
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prosecution’s case. The fairness of a plea typically hinges not on the
amount of information a defendant possesses, but rather on whether
the plea is made voluntarily and with the assistance of competent
counsel to protect the defendant’s interests.24 Moreover, a fair trial
implicates a host of procedural protections—including rules for
discovery and disclosure of information to the defendant—that are
absent from a fair plea, and indeed may be waived by a defendant.25
Finally, whereas a fair trial involves a forced settlement of a factual
dispute in a fair adversarial contest before a judge and jury, a fair plea
typically does not involve a factual dispute, is not considered an
adversarial proceeding, and involves the functional equivalent of a
stipulated set of facts. For these reasons, Professor Cassidy’s attempt
to equate disclosure in these different contexts is a difficult,
challenging, and problematic undertaking.
I. REJECTING PREPLEA DISCLOSURE OF IMPEACHMENT EVIDENCE
Professor Cassidy’s proposal to broaden disclosure of
impeachment evidence preplea suffers from three major defects. First,
it is difficult—maybe even impossible—to gauge the value of most
impeachment evidence prior to a plea, and therefore impeachment
evidence is a dubious candidate for preplea disclosure. Second, even if
the materiality of impeachment evidence could be ascertained,
disclosure probably would not be a significant factor in a defendant’s
decision to plead guilty. Finally, there are considerable costs involved
in broadening preplea disclosure of impeachment evidence—costs that
drain the efficient use of prosecutorial and judicial resources as well
as threaten the privacy and safety of witnesses.
As Professor Cassidy explains, there is a significant difference
between impeachment evidence and exculpatory evidence.26
Exculpatory evidence directly supports innocence. It includes scientific
evidence excluding the defendant as the perpetrator and proof that a
third person committed the crime. Impeachment evidence, by contrast,
may prove innocence indirectly by discrediting a prosecution witness
who testifies about key elements relating to the defendant’s
commission of the crime.27 Professor Cassidy focuses on early
24. See Boykin v. Alabama, 395 U.S. 238, 243 & n.5 (1969) (holding that a guilty plea must
be voluntary in order to effectively waive rights to trial by jury, to confront accusers, and to avoid
self-incrimination).
25. See United States v. Ruiz, 536 U.S. 622, 625 (2002) (finding that a “fast track” plea
bargain—in which defendants waive indictment, trial, and appeal—is not unconstitutional).
26. See Cassidy, supra note 5, at 1437–45.
27. To be sure, exculpatory evidence and impeachment evidence are not mutually
exclusive. Some impeachment evidence may be so compelling as to severely discredit a key
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disclosure of ordinary impeachment evidence that does not prove the
defendant’s factual innocence. He comes out in favor of expanding the
prosecutor’s requirement to disclose impeachment evidence, at least as
to certain categories of material.28
Professor Cassidy makes his reform proposals against the
backdrop of the Supreme Court’s 2002 opinion in United States v.
Ruiz.29 However, as Professor Cassidy recognizes, mandating preplea
disclosure of impeachment information through the Constitution is a
moot point after the unanimous decision in Ruiz, which held that the
Fifth and Sixth Amendments do not require a prosecutor to disclose
impeachment information prior to a defendant’s guilty plea.30 The
Court reasoned that impeachment information is relevant to the
fairness of a trial, not to the voluntariness or fairness of a plea.31
Moreover, according to the Court, the efficient administration of
justice would suffer if a prosecutor had to devote more time and
resources to securing a plea.32 And finally, preplea disclosure might
endanger the safety of witnesses.33 However, the Court did not decide
whether a prosecutor may be required to disclose preplea exculpatory
evidence that supports a claim of factual innocence. Nor did it forbid
rulemaking authorities from adopting stricter disclosure standards for
impeachment evidence.
Unlike Professor Cassidy, and in agreement with the Court’s
rationales in Ruiz, I do not support a general rule of criminal
discovery that would mandate extensive preplea discovery—especially
one that would require disclosure of an array of different types of
impeachment evidence prior to a defendant’s guilty plea.34 Except in
witness’s testimony linking the defendant to the crime, thereby proving factual innocence. See,
e.g., Smith v. Cain, 132 S. Ct. 627, 629–31 (2012) (ordering new trial where only eyewitness
previously told police he could not supply a description of the perpetrators, “could not ID
anyone,” and “would not know them if [he] saw them” (alteration in original)); Kyles v. Whitley,
514 U.S. 419, 442 (1995) (ordering new trial where key eyewitness gave statement to police that
was “vastly different” from trial testimony).
28. Cassidy, supra note 5, at 1482–86. Specifically, Professor Cassidy suggests that he
would require disclosures where a witness fails to identify the defendant in a lineup and where
the government has given the witness an inducement to testify. Id. at 1482. His approach would
also require disclosure of “substantial inconsistencies between a witness’s version of events on
key elements of the government’s proof.” Id. at 1483–84.
29. 536 U.S. 622.
30. Id. at 625.
31. Id. at 629.
32. Id. at 632.
33. Id. at 631–32.
34. Professor Cassidy begins his piece by describing serious “flaws” in prosecutors’
discovery practices and by citing prominent cases documenting misconduct. However, while
these flawed practices involved nondisclosures of significant impeachment evidence, the
nondisclosures occurred in connection with the defendants’ trials and prejudiced the verdicts—
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extreme instances of prosecutorial concealment—such as concealment
of exculpatory or impeachment evidence that would support a claim of
factual innocence—and despite the arguments of several distinguished
commentators to the contrary,35 I am not convinced that significantly
broadening the disclosure of impeachment evidence during plea
bargaining is a necessary reform or that it will make much of a
difference to defendants who are contemplating a plea. Furthermore, I
do not believe that any incremental benefit in increased disclosure
would outweigh the added expenditures of time and resources by
prosecutors and the judicial system.
Professor Cassidy asserts that impeachment evidence contains
“limitless elasticity”36 and presents far greater “complexities”37 than
exculpatory evidence.38 As a result, he believes it is much more
difficult for a prosecutor to assess the materiality of such evidence
before trial.39 He also claims that it is easier to assess the materiality
of exculpatory evidence than the materiality of impeachment
evidence.40 This assessment is correct. But Professor Cassidy fails to
they did not involve a guilty plea. Moreover, recent efforts by the Department of Justice to
improve discovery practice—which Professor Cassidy effectively critiques—appear to focus not
on preplea disclosure but on pretrial disclosure. Finally, the recent ethics opinion by the ABA
Standing Committee—which Professor Cassidy also effectively critiques—appears to focus more
on pretrial disclosure of exculpatory evidence than preplea disclosure of impeachment evidence.
35. See Kevin C. McMunigal, Disclosure and Accuracy in the Guilty Plea Process, 40
HASTINGS L.J. 957, 959 (1989) (advocating a constitutional, ethical, and statutory mandate to
disclose Brady material to criminal defendants during plea bargaining); Ellen Yaroshefsky,
Ethics and Plea Bargaining: What’s Discovery Got to Do With It?, CRIM. JUST., Fall 2008, at 28,
33, 59 (arguing that “open file” discovery should be expanded and standardized to allow
defendants access to the government’s evidence).
36. Cassidy, supra note 5, at 1431.
37. Id. at 1441.
38. To be sure, Professor Cassidy’s characterization of impeachment evidence as “elastic”
and “nuanced” may be entirely accurate. But the same terminology could be used to describe
many other types of proof, such as circumstantial evidence, opinion evidence, character evidence,
and hearsay evidence. Moreover, there are instances where “core” or “classic” exculpatory
evidence could also be characterized as “elastic,” “complex,” “intractable,” and “nuanced.” An
eyewitness’s account of the crime and the witness’s identification often contain discrepancies
involving perception, recollection, and retrieval, which, if sufficiently material, can effectively
undercut that observation.
39. It appears that Professor Cassidy’s discussion is referring to the use of this evidence at
a trial rather than preplea. He refers to an assessment of this information by a “jury,” the way in
which the information will affect the witness’s credibility, and how an appellate court will review
the “trial record.” Id. at 1439–41.
40. Id. at 1439. One of the problems in assessing the materiality of undisclosed evidence
when a defendant pleads guilty is identifying the appropriate test to be used. In discussing the
materiality of undisclosed evidence when a defendant pleads guilty, Professor Cassidy asks,
“[M]aterial as to what? . . . [T]he likely effect of the impeachment evidence on a trial . . . or the
likely effect . . . on the defendant’s decision to plead guilty?” Id. at 1479. Professor Cassidy does
not answer this question, although he does refer to other commentary on the subject. Id. at 1479

Gershman_Ready for PDF.docx (Do Not Delete)

148

VANDERBILT LAW REVIEW EN BANC

7/26/12 12:09 PM

[Vol. 65:141

draw the proper conclusion from his analysis—that disclosure of
exculpatory evidence and ordinary impeachment evidence should be
treated differently. If one’s focus is on the fairness and accuracy of the
plea process, it would seem that a prosecutor’s duty to disclose
ordinary, nonexculpatory impeachment evidence would be far less
compelling than his duty to disclose exculpatory evidence. Evidence
that shows a witness may be lying or mistaken usually is more
attenuated proof of innocence than evidence that would directly
exonerate a defendant, or (in the familiar constitutional due process
test) evidence that, if disclosed, would create a reasonable probability
that the defendant would be acquitted. Impeachment evidence usually
is uncertain, ambiguous, and contingent. The witness, even if called,
has not yet testified, and it is difficult to predict how the testimony
will be developed. Also, prosecutors may more readily discount the
probative value of impeachment evidence because it may be
cumulative of other evidence that has already been used to impeach
the witness.41
Even assuming a prosecutor can overcome the evaluative
challenges that impeachment evidence presents, is there any reason to
believe that disclosure of ordinary impeachment evidence, as distinct
from disclosure of exculpatory evidence, would make any appreciable
difference to a defendant contemplating a guilty plea? If a justification
for preplea disclosure is to provide defendants with adequate
information,42 cases involving exculpatory evidence offer a far stronger
justification for preplea disclosure than those involving ordinary
impeachment evidence.43 It seems to me that the only instance in
n.240. In general, Professor Cassidy is probably correct that it is easier to assess the materiality
of exculpatory evidence than that of impeachment evidence, yet it is noteworthy that several
recent Supreme Court decisions involved the nondisclosure of impeachment evidence, the
materiality of which was not a difficult call. See, e.g., Smith v. Cain, 132 S. Ct. 627, 630 (2012)
(holding that withheld evidence impeaching an eyewitness was material); Cone v. Bell, 556 U.S.
449, 470–71, 476 (2009) (remanding for further consideration of withheld evidence that could
impeach witnesses); Banks v. Dretke, 540 U.S. 668, 698–703 (2004) (finding material State’s
withholding of identity of key witness as police informant); Kyles v. Whitley, 514 U.S. 419, 454
(1995) (reversing denial of habeas petition where impeachment evidence was withheld).
41. See, e.g., Johns v. Bowersox, 203 F.3d 538, 546 (8th Cir. 2000) (finding no Brady
violation because suppressed evidence had limited impeachment value); United States v.
Avelino, 136 F.3d 249 (2d Cir. 1998) (finding no reasonable probability that defendant would
have pled not guilty but for undisclosed impeachment evidence); see also Wetzel v. Lambert, 132
S. Ct. 1195, 1198 (2012) (noting role of cumulativeness to materiality determination).
42. To be clear, neither Professor Cassidy nor I believe this “accuracy” argument is a
sufficient reason to require preplea disclosure of impeachment evidence, though other scholars
have argued to the contrary. See Cassidy, supra note 5, at 1468–76 (describing and refuting the
“accuracy” argument).
43. See, e.g., Youngblood v. West Virginia, 547 U.S. 867, 868 (2006) (describing note
withheld by state trooper indicating that victim’s testimony was false and that sexual encounter
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which disclosure of impeachment evidence preplea would significantly
influence a defendant’s decision would be in the rare case where such
evidence supports a claim of factual innocence.
Professor Cassidy employs several examples to demonstrate
the elasticity of impeachment information and the potential
usefulness of such evidence to a defendant’s decision to plead guilty.44
The examples describe several of the major impeachment
techniques—a witness’s prior inconsistent statements, impaired
capacity to observe or remember, and misconduct affecting the
witness’s character for truthfulness. Some of these examples are
clearly relevant as potential avenues of impeachment. However, they
do not appear to me to be of significant value in discrediting the
witness, and it is unlikely that disclosure of this information would
realistically affect a defendant’s decision to plead guilty.
Professor Cassidy’s examples illustrate the intractable nature
of impeachment evidence. But it is unclear whether any of the
impeachment information Professor Cassidy posits should be disclosed
either under discovery rules generally or in connection with a
prosecutor’s Brady duty.45 He suggests that most conscientious
prosecutors would view his first example involving a victim’s
inconsistencies on minor details of her story as requiring disclosure
under Brady, and he expects widespread disagreement among
prosecutors on whether the other situations require Brady
disclosure.46 Even heeding the Supreme Court’s admonition to
prosecutors to err on the side of transparency,47 I strongly disagree
with victim was consensual); Banks, 540 U.S. at 674 (describing allegation that key witness was
police informant who provided false testimony); Kyles, 514 U.S. at 441–45 (discussing
eyewitnesses’ mistaken identification of defendant); United States v. Agurs, 427 U.S. 97, 110
n.18 (1976) (discussing police report indicating that fingerprints on murder weapon proved that
defendant could not have fired fatal shot).
44. Professor Cassidy’s scenarios involve (1) a witness’s alteration over time of “minor
details” of her story (impeachment by showing that a witness made prior inconsistent
statements); (2) a case in which one of four eyewitnesses to a crime had been drinking alcohol at
a party earlier in the evening (impeachment by undermining a witness’s capacity to observe or
recall an event); (3) an FBI case agent accused of violating bureau policies (impeachment by
showing a witness’s commission of a prior wrongful act); (4) an eyewitness who has informed the
prosecutor that she cannot remember where she parked her car (impeachment by showing a
witness’s deficient memory); and (5) a case in which one of several eyewitnesses to a barroom
fight advised the prosecutor that she heard that the victim is a “serious pothead” (impeachment
of the victim’s credibility through a hearsay statement). Cassidy, supra note 5, at 1438–39.
45. See Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83, 87 (1963) (“[T]he suppression by the prosecution of
evidence favorable to an accused upon request violates due process where the evidence is
material either to guilt or to punishment, irrespective of the good faith or bad faith of the
prosecution.”).
46. Cassidy, supra note 5, at 1441.
47. See Cone v. Bell, 556 U.S. 449, 470 n.15 (2009) (“[T]he prudent prosecutor will err on
the side of transparency, resolving doubtful questions in favor of disclosure.”); Kyles, 514 U.S. at
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with Professor Cassidy that many prosecutors would believe that
there exists a constitutional or ethical duty to make disclosures in any
of the scenarios he provides.48 The examples represent potentially
useful impeachment opportunities, but ones of uncertain and
unknown value. It is unlikely that any of this information would affect
in any meaningfully way a jury’s assessment of the witness’s
credibility or that it would, to state the familiar Brady standard,
create a reasonable probability that with this information a jury would
acquit the defendant.49 And given the coercive pressures on a
defendant to plead guilty, it is a stretch to suggest that knowledge of
this information would influence a defendant’s decision. Moreover,
even assuming that a prosecutor would be required preplea to disclose
to the defense impeachment evidence that strongly supports a factual
claim of innocence, Professor Cassidy’s examples do not represent the
kinds of impeachment evidence that would support such a claim even
under the most demanding interpretation of Brady’s disclosure
standard.50
Furthermore, the apparent justification for broader preplea
disclosure—to ensure that the plea is voluntary and accurate—does
not require disclosure of the above examples of impeachment
information. Professor Cassidy concedes correctly that disclosure of
this evidence does not affect the voluntariness of the plea.51 As the
Supreme Court noted in Ruiz, a defendant’s free will is hardly affected
439 (“[A] prosecutor anxious about tacking too close to the wind will disclose a favorable piece of
evidence.”).
48. Indeed, it is not clear that any of this evidence would be relevant. For example, it is
unclear whether a witness’s consumption of a glass of wine at a party affects the witness’s ability
to perceive; that forgetting where one parked one’s car suggests faulty memory (who hasn’t
sometimes forgotten where they parked their car?); or that the unsubstantiated accusation
against an FBI agent would even be considered favorable, let alone admissible, as it does not
appear to involve dishonesty. Finally, the hearsay statement that the victim is a pothead,
without more, has very little value. To be sure, as Professor Cassidy notes, these examples do not
encompass other important categories of impeachment evidence that traditionally are used to
discredit a witness, such as a witness’s criminal record, mental infirmity, or a motive to lie.
49. See Kyles, 514 U.S. at 421 (interpreting Brady to require a prosecutor to turn over
evidence where there is a reasonable probability that disclosure would produce a different
result).
50. It would be interesting to speculate whether, given the recent Supreme Court decisions
finding that the prosecutor violated Brady by failing to disclose impeachment evidence to a
defendant who was convicted after trial, these same situations would also violate Brady if the
defendant had pleaded guilty and the prosecutor obtained a Ruiz waiver from him. See supra
note 40 (listing recent Brady decisions). These instances all involved blatant and arguably
intentional prosecutorial misconduct and clearly present much harder Brady questions than
Professor Cassidy’s impeachment scenarios. To the extent that the undisclosed evidence in the
Supreme Court cases strongly supports a claim of factual innocence, the Court might very well
find a due process violation, notwithstanding the waiver.
51. Cassidy, supra note 5, at 1466–67.
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by the amount of information he possesses.52 In the Miranda context,
by way of analogy, the voluntariness of a waiver is unaffected by the
defendant’s ignorance of the subject matter of the interrogation,53 his
lawyer’s efforts to contact him,54 or the fact that a previously
unwarned statement may not be used against him.55 Accuracy of the
plea is a much stronger justification for disclosure, as Professor
Cassidy notes.56 But it is unreasonable to believe that the disclosure of
ordinary, nonexculpatory impeachment information—the types of
impeachment information in Professor Cassidy’s examples—would
affect in any meaningful way the reliability of a defendant’s open
acknowledgement of guilt.57
Finally, as Professor Cassidy recognizes, broadening
impeachment disclosure preplea would impose significant burdens on
the efficient use of prosecutorial and judicial resources as well as
undermine the privacy and safety of witnesses. Prosecutors would be
required to expend considerable time reviewing case files for
impeachment information and, in some cases, seeking a court’s
intervention for orders permitting nondisclosure. This time could be
used for ongoing investigations and trial preparation. Moreover, early
disclosure would compromise the privacy and safety of witnesses,
thereby negating one of the principal benefits of pleas. The costs of
broadening impeachment disclosure, in short, would seriously
outweigh the uncertain and often marginal benefits to a defendant
contemplating a plea.
II. THE ABA’S INTERPRETATION OF MODEL RULE 3.8
Professor Cassidy’s exploration of impeachment evidence in the
guilty-plea context provides an opportunity to examine a recent
opinion of the ABA’s Standing Committee on Ethics and Professional
Responsibility that elaborates on a prosecutor’s disclosure duty under

52. United States v. Ruiz, 536 U.S. 622, 629 (2002).
53. See Colorado v. Spring, 479 U.S. 564, 574 (1987) (“The Constitution does not require
that a criminal suspect know and understand every possible consequence of a waiver of the Fifth
Amendment privilege.”).
54. See Moran v. Burbine, 475 U.S. 412, 423 (1986) (holding that the police’s failure to
inform the defendant of his lawyer’s telephone call was insufficient to “vitiate the validity of a
waiver”).
55. See Oregon v. Elstad, 470 U.S. 298, 318 (1985) (“[A] suspect who has once responded to
unwarned yet uncoercive questioning is not thereby disabled from waiving his rights and
confessing after he has been given the requisite Miranda warnings.”).
56. Cassidy, supra note 5, at 1468.
57. It should be noted that guilty pleas are permitted even though a defendant protests his
innocence. See North Carolina v. Alford, 400 U.S. 25, 37 (1970).
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Model Rule 3.8(d). The ABA opinion requires a prosecutor to disclose
to the defense all favorable evidence or information, regardless of
whether the information would be considered material under the
constitutional Brady standard.58 Professor Cassidy skillfully takes
apart the bar opinion, whose reasoning he finds “misguided and
flawed.”59 In examining the history of Rule 3.8(d), he suggests
convincingly that the materiality concept was retained when the
ethics rule was promulgated, despite the opinion’s disclaimer.60
Indeed, the Rule’s phrase “tends to negate guilt” is quite similar to the
language used in Brady. Professor Cassidy also points out that, under
the ABA’s new interpretation, a prosecutor may be in violation of the
ethics rule by not disclosing information preplea even though he may
be in full compliance with his due process duty under Ruiz—not a
healthy conflict for a prosecutor.61 Moreover, as Professor Cassidy
notes, the bar opinion forbids a prosecutor to seek a waiver of access to
impeachment information from a defendant who pleads guilty.62
However, this part of the opinion not only is in conflict with Ruiz,
which unanimously ruled that a prosecutor may seek a waiver, but it
also finds no support in the text of the rule. And finally, as Professor
Cassidy notes, the opinion is perverse in one important respect—it
imposes a disclosure duty on a prosecutor that is narrower than the
constitutional duty, because it applies only to information of which a
prosecutor has actual knowledge.63 Contrary to clear Supreme Court
authority,64 the bar opinion does not require that a prosecutor attempt
to locate Brady information that other agencies involved in the
investigation might possess.65
Although I agree with much of Professor Cassidy’s treatment of
the ABA opinion, I part company with him in a few places. He
portrays the opinion as creating a “firestorm” and portending “serious
battles” or even a “showdown” with prosecutors over disclosure
practices.66 I am not convinced that Professor Cassidy’s fears are well
58. ABA Comm. on Ethics and Prof’l Responsibility, Formal Op. 09-454 at 1 (2009)
[hereinafter ABA Formal Op. 09-454].
59. Cassidy, supra note 5, at 1458.
60. Id.
61. Id. at 1455.
62. Id. at 1456.
63. Id. at 1457.
64. See Kyles v. Whitley, 514 U.S. 419, 437 (1995) (“[T]he individual prosecutor has a duty
to learn of any favorable evidence known to the others acting on the government’s behalf in the
case, including the police.”).
65. Indeed, I am unaware of any other bar opinion that appears to impose a less
demanding ethical duty on a lawyer than the duty required by the Constitution or statutes.
66. Cassidy, supra note 5, at 1432, 1453.
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founded. First, his apprehensions appear to be based on two previous
ethical “battles”—the government’s efforts to subpoena a defendant’s
lawyer before a grand jury, in violation of Model Rule 3.8(f), and the
government’s efforts to contact a defendant without his lawyer’s
knowledge, in violation of Model Rule 4.2.67 However, these disputes
concerned a very different ethical issue—they involved actions by the
government that potentially could destroy the attorney-client
relationship. These are the kinds of actions that readily invite
condemnation by the bar. They are quite distinct from the
government’s long-standing statutory authority to restrict the amount
of discoverable information to which a defense attorney has access
prior to trial.
Moreover, it is not clear that the bar opinion even applies to
the disclosure of impeachment evidence at all, or that it applies to
preplea disclosure. The opinion restates the disclosure standard in
Rule 3.8(d)—evidence or information that “tends to negate guilt”—but
never defines that standard. The rule suggests, and the opinion
declares, that the standard imposes a more demanding duty on a
prosecutor than the constitutional materiality standard, and the
opinion “explores” the prosecutor’s disclosure duty through a
hypothetical. However, that hypothetical involves the disclosure of
exculpatory evidence, not impeachment evidence, and it is used in a
context that appears to address a pretrial disclosure, not a preplea
disclosure.68
In sum, while Professor Cassidy effectively demonstrates
several weaknesses in the bar opinion’s treatment of a prosecutor’s
disclosure duty, he may be assuming, incorrectly, that the opinion
applies to a prosecutor’s disclosure of impeachment evidence. From its

67. See id. at 1432 & n.9 (discussing disputes over Model Rules 3.8(f) and 4.2).
68. The opinion posits the hypothetical of a robbery case in which the victim and a
bystander have identified the defendant from a photo array and a lineup. However, the
prosecutor has learned that two other eyewitnesses who viewed the same lineup did not identify
the defendant, as well as that there was a confidential informant who attributed the robbery to
someone else. ABA Formal Op. 09-454, supra note 58, at 2. The opinion also refers several times
to the prosecutor’s disclosure of “exculpatory evidence.” Id. at 5. The opinion claims that the
information in the hypothetical is not necessarily material under the constitutional test but
would tend to negate guilt under the ethical standard of 3.8(d), regardless of the strength of the
remaining evidence and even if the prosecutor believes that the evidence is unreliable. Id. The
opinion further states that there is no de minimis exception to the prosecutor’s disclosure duty,
which essentially requires a prosecutor to disclose virtually all information that may be viewed
as favorable to a defendant or that tends to negate guilt. Id. It seems to me that most
conscientious prosecutors would view the information in the bar opinion hypothetical as required
to be disclosed under Brady. Moreover, to suggest that a prosecutor is ethically required to
disclose all favorable information, no matter how minimal, effectively renders the bar opinion the
functional equivalent of an open-file policy.
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text it appears that the opinion applies to exculpatory evidence only.
Moreover, Professor Cassidy may be overstating the significance of the
opinion on the disclosure obligations of prosecutors. I have not seen
anything to suggest that this bar opinion is related to earlier battles
over the ethical rules on government subpoenas to lawyers and on
secretly contacting a client’s lawyer. Indeed, the disclosure of evidence
prior to plea is a much less controversial topic.
CONCLUSION
I concur with Professor Cassidy that constitutional and
statutory rules of procedure are far better vehicles to regulate and
guide prosecutors than ethics rules and opinions—especially when the
ethics rules purport to provide guidance to prosecutors but are so
unclear that they fail to do so. Given the vacuum created by the
failure to enact statutory discovery reforms, the inappropriateness of
regulation by ethics agencies, and the Ruiz decision, Professor Cassidy
takes an understandably cautious approach to disclosure of
impeachment information before a guilty plea. Because preplea
disclosure presents special dangers and problems in terms of
efficiency, witness safety, and victim privacy, he advocates as the most
promising approach—either under Brady or as a general approach to
preplea discovery—rulemaking by individual jurisdictions. The
substance of these rules would require disclosure of specific categories
of impeachment information and would provide time schedules for
that disclosure.69
These are all good suggestions. Professor Cassidy’s article
provides added support for meaningful discovery reform, greater
Brady compliance by prosecutors, and increased preplea disclosure of
information supporting factual innocence. But in the end, I am still
hesitant to adopt rules mandating preplea discovery of nonexculpatory
material, even if disclosure is limited to specific categories of evidence.
Given my own experience with the plea process, and having observed
the process over the years, I continue to believe that—assuming they
bargain honestly and in good faith—prosecutors should not be
constrained in their ability to obtain pleas by categorical rules of
discovery that could undermine the efficiency of the plea process and
threaten the privacy and safety of witnesses.

69.

See Cassidy, supra note 5, at 1483–84.

